

SECURITY INFORMATION

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*Corrected
Copy*DRAFT (3)

22 July 1952

C I A SUMMARY

There has been some progress in achieving the national objectives set forth in NSC 10/2 and 10/5. This progress, however, has been slow and in most areas severely restricted, partly by the limited nature of available resources and capabilities, but even more by time limitations. It takes a long time to develop the apparatus and the trained personnel for covert activities *and the development of concepts and doctrine.* of the kind discussed in this report, *and the engaged in covert activities only a* and the United States has been in *the business* for too brief a period, and therefore present developments fall far short of ultimate potential.

EUROPE

In Western Europe, CIA reports that Soviet power and influence have been contained in France and Italy. An indication of *the* progress *of containment* in this 25X1

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area.

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In the particularly important field of the Moslem world, some progress 25X6
has been achieved along the following lines:

2. In stimulating an increased awareness among the religious hierarchy of the threat of international Communism;

3. In increasing the degree of understanding of the status of Moslems living inside the Soviet orbit; and

4. In laying the groundwork for further expanded activities along similar lines. Progress will continue to be slow in this field because of the most delicate and dangerous aspect of Near Eastern affairs from the point of view of foreign intervention.

Along these lines, the report emphasizes, however, that this progress has been slow and will continue to be so.

FAR EAST

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While, on balance, the U. S. has achieved some psychological gains in the overt field (Treaty of Peace with Japan, Pacific Military Alliances, etc.), the report states bluntly that Soviet power has not been measurably reduced in the Far Eastern areas under its dominance, and that progress toward our objectives

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KOREA

Korea

CIA regards existing coordinating machinery between civilian and military authorities in the field of psychological warfare as inadequate in certain respects. A coordinating mechanism [] was set up, for example, but failed to include the operations or USMC services in Korea. Close cooperation with the military exists in the field on intelligence and tactical psychological warfare measures. However, a completely effective coordination of two major strategic plans with respect to Korea has not been realized with respect to coordination of command and logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy this situation.

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Satisfactory progress was also reported in laying the groundwork for future behind-the-lines guerrilla activities.

LATIN AMERICA

Despite evidence that the Soviet Union is now placing greater emphasis on its covert mechanisms in Latin America, U. S. covert capabilities have substantially increased there, through the expansion of personnel and facilities

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CIA has had
against the Chinese Communist regime. For the shorter terms, *the report*
admits only very limited success in the penetration either of Communist
China or the USSR itself.

[The CIA report] points up the vital importance of VOA as constituting
at present the only effective means the U. S. possesses for conducting
psychological operations within the confines of the USSR. [The report

Through its covert channels CIA has discovered that VOA broadcasts
have been audible in the USSR throughout 1950 and 1951. Although Soviet
jamming has considerably reduced the audibility of these broadcasts, never-
theless information obtained from returning German prisoners of war and
Soviet refugees and defectors indicates that considerable segments of the
Soviet peoples continue to listen to VOA broadcasts despite technical diffi-
culties and personal risk. Some of these refugees have criticised the VOA
broadcasts for not being sufficiently forceful and for devoting a consider-
able portion of the programs to irrelevant matters not bearing directly on
the current East-West struggle. Furthermore, ethnic groups such as the
Ukrainians have complained that the broadcasts are not sufficiently repre-
sentative of the desires and aspirations of the minority groups within the
USSR. But when all this is said, the fact remains that information obtained

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by CIA indicates that the VOA broadcasts do play an important role in reminding the peoples of the Soviet Union that there is an alternative way of life and in providing them with hope of ultimate liberation.

Despite a marked increase in the amount of radio propaganda indirectly aimed at encouraging Soviet defectors, [the report finds] there was no increase in the number of said defectors over the past year. [It calls for] greater emphasis on the psychological utilization of defectors, particularly as the core of covert activist cadres *would be desirable*.

In Western Europe especially, *7 there was* the report notes marked progress in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

INTERNATIONAL

Major factors that impede the successful prosecution of a national psychological program are *stated* listed by the CIA ~~report~~ as including:

- a. The continuing inequality in the distribution of income in Western Europe, particularly France, Italy, and Germany, and the very limited success that MSA (and ECA) has had in

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2. Covert problem
3. To be treated
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had in bringing pressure to bear to change this situation.

b. The excessively militaristic and aggressive tone of some of the statements made by our Government officials which play directly into the hands of the Soviet peace offensive.

c. The inability of the U. S. Government on specific issues relating to colonialism to take a firm and clear stand because of the exigencies of the European alliance system.

d. The Achilles heel of the racial issue in the United States and the ineffective efforts to date to deal with the exploitation of this situation by the Communists.

e. The McCarran Act and its limiting prohibitions on immigration into this country.

f. The fact that our tariff structure runs directly counter to our efforts to expand international trade and severely limits the ability of foreign countries to export to this country.

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